Sonia Sedivy
Associate Chair
Email
Telephone number
416-287-7159
Status
on sabbatical
Website
Biography
- BA, University of Toronto
- PhD, University of Pittsburgh
Prof. Sedivy received her Honours BA in Psychology from the University of Toronto and her PhD in Philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh. Her primary research and teaching interests are in the philosophy of mind, especially the philosophy of perception, in the philosophy of art and in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
She has just published , which uses her approach to perception and her understanding of Wittgenstein to offer a new understanding of beauty and art while also addressing the question whether the tradition of Western art came to an end with the end of modernism.
Teaching Interests
Teaching in 2024-25
PHLB91: Theories of Human Nature
PHLC37: Kant
Research Interests
Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
Publications
Books
- 2021. New York: Routledge.
- 2016. Beauty and the End of Art: Wittgenstein, Plurality, and Perception. London, New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Articles
- 2014. 鈥淎rt from a Wittgensteinian Perspective: Constitutive Norms in Context鈥 Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 72(1):67-82.
- 2008. 鈥淪tarting Afresh Disjunctively.鈥 In Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, 348-375. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Starting Afresh Disjunctivism.pdf)
- 2006. 鈥淣onconceptual Epicycles.鈥 European Review of Philosophy 6: 33-66. (Nonconceptual Epicycles.pdf)
- 2004. 鈥淲ittgenstein鈥檚 Diagnosis of Empiricism鈥檚 Third Dogma: Why Perception is not an Amalgam of Sensations and Conceptualization.鈥 Philosophical Investigations 27(1) 1-33.
- 2004. 鈥淢inds: Contents without Vehicles.鈥 Philosophical Psychology 17(2): 149-179. (Minds Contents Without Vehicles.pdf)
- 2004. 鈥淲ittgenstein Against Interpretation: 鈥渢he Meaning of a Text Does Not Stop Short of its Facts.鈥 In John Gibson Wolfgang Hummer eds. The Literary Wittgenstein. Routledge 165-185.
- 1996. 鈥淢ust Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Non-Conceptual Content?鈥 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26(3) 413-431.
For more on Prof. Sedivy鈥檚 publications .