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Benj Hellie

Benj Hellie
Professor
Telephone number
416-287-7151
Fax number
416-208-2669
Building MW 388

Biography

Professor Hellie鈥檚 research interests include philosophy of mind (consciousness, rationality, intentionality, perception, action); epistemology and philosophical semantics (traditional and formal); and the history of analytical philosophy (especially David Lewis). His central research program explores the prospects and consequences of abandoning the centrality of truth to the theory of meaning: in particular, of reconciling the structures and concerns of the analytical tradition with an 鈥榓ntirealist鈥 approach to mind characteristic of the hermeneutical tradition. For more information, please visit .

Education

  • PhD, Princeton University
  • BA, Stanford University

Teaching Interests

Teaching in 2024-25

PHLB20: Belief, Knowledge and Truth
PHLC22: Topics in the Theory of Knowledge
PHLC99: Philosophical Development Seminar
 

Research Interests

Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

Publications

  • 鈥淩elativized metaphysical modality鈥, with Adam Russell Murray and Jessica Wilson, Routledge Handbook of Modality, Ottavio Bueno and Scott Shalkowski, editors, 2018.
  • 鈥淎n analytic鈥揾ermeneutic history of Consciousness鈥, Cambridge History of Philosophy: 1945鈥2015, Kelly Michael Becker and Iain Thomson, editors, 2018.
  • 鈥淧raxeology, imperatives, and shifts of view鈥, Process, Action, and Experience, Rowland Stout, editor, OUP, 2018.
  • 鈥淒avid Lewis and the Kangaroo: Graphing philosophical progress鈥, Philosophy鈥檚 Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress, Russell Blackford and Damien Broderick, editors, Blackwell, 2017.
  • 鈥淩ationalization and the Ross Paradox鈥, Deontic Modality, Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman, editors, OUP, 2016.
  • 鈥淟ove in the time of cholera鈥, Does Perception Have Content?, Brit Brogaard, editor, OUP, 2014.
  • 鈥淭here it is鈥, Philosophical Issues, 2011.
  • 鈥淔active phenomenal characters鈥, Philosophical Perspectives, 2007.
  • 鈥淣oise and perceptual indiscriminability鈥, Mind, 2005.